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Abstract
A merger proposal occurs when a bidder firm offers to purchase the control
rights in a target firm. Predicting who will propose merger bids (bidder
candidacy) and who will receive merger bids (target candidacy) is important
to measure the price impact of mergers. This study investigates the perfor-
mance of artificial neural networks and multinomial logit models in predicting
bidder and target candidacy. We use a comprehensive dataset that covers
the years 1979 to 2004 and includes all deals with publicly listed bidders and
targets. We find that both models perform similarly while predicting target
and non-merger firms. The multinomial logit model performs slightly better
in predicting bidder firms.
Key words: finance, mergers, artificial neural network models, multinomial
logit models
1. Introduction
Merger announcements disclose the intent of bidder firms to purchase
control rights in a target firm. One of the important merger-related ques-
tions is whether bidder and target candidacy is predictable. Hedge funds use
investment strategies called ‘merger arbitrage’ that rely on the prediction of
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bidder and target companies 1. To understand the possible impact of merger
arbitrage strategies, one needs to model and estimate the merger choice and
completion. Furthermore, predictability may affect how researchers measure
the price impact of mergers. If merger candidacy is predictable, bidder and
target shares would reflect the impact of mergers prior to merger announce-
ments. As a result, event study methods that calculate event returns around
merger announcements may incorrectly measure the price impact of mergers
(Cornett et al., 2011; Tanyeri, 2006). To correctly measure the price impact
of mergers, it becomes important to model and estimate predictability. This
study investigates the performance of artificial neural network model and
multinomial logit model in predicting merger candidacy.
Artificial neural network models are well-suited for finance applications
(such as bankruptcy prediction, credit risk assessment, and stock price pre-
diction) since they can successfully represent non-linear relationships between
input and output variables. This paper advances the literature on artificial
neural networks and mergers by comparing how artificial neural networks
and multinomial logistic regressions perform in predicting merger candidacy.
This is the first study to use a comprehensive dataset covering the years 1979
to 2004 and all deals with publicly listed bidders and targets. Our sample
covers 315,927 observations.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines previous studies on
merger prediction. Section 3 presents some of the finance area applications of
artificial neural networks. Section 4 describes the proxies for merger motives
used to model the merger choice, and introduces the multinomial logit mod-
els and artificial neural network models used to estimate merger candidacy.
Section 5 compares the results obtained with multinomial logit and artificial
neural network models. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Studies on Merger Candidacy
Previous merger studies use two approaches to model merger candidacy.
First approach identifies a single firm characteristic that is used for clas-
sification of anticipated and unanticipated merger deals. Second approach
1Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) define merger arbitrage, or risk arbitrage, as an invest-
ment strategy that attempts to profit from the spread between target stock’s price and the
offer price for target shares. Merger arbitrageurs realize returns conditional on whether
deals are successfully completed (Mitchell and Pulvino, 2001; Mitchell et al., 2007).
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develops predictive models of merger candidacy that use multiple firm char-
acteristics to classify merger deals. Using a single variable for classification
of anticipated and unanticipated deals is easy to use and interpret. However,
predictive models of merger candidacy provide a more comprehensive picture
of merger candidacy as they can incorporate multiple variables that measure
different merger motives.
The existence of an announced program of mergers (Shipper and Thomp-
son, 1983; Malatesta and Thompson, 1985), merger frequency (Asquith et al.,
1983; Loderer and Martin, 1990; Fuller et al., 2002; Ismail, 2005), time
elapsed between mergers (Song and Walkling, 2000, 2005) are the variables
that the first strand of papers used for classification of anticipated and unan-
ticipated deals. The second strand of papers estimate models of merger
candidacy using: logistic models (Dietrich and Sorenson, 1984; Palepu, 1986;
Ambrose and Megginson, 1992; Akhigbe et al., 2004; Cremers et al., 2009),
probit models (Eckbo et al., 1990; Cornett et al., 2011) and artificial neural
network models (Sen and Gibbs, 1994).
3. Finance Applications of Artificial Neural Networks
Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) are mathematical modeling tools which
perform complex function mappings (Hornik et al., 1989). ANNs successfully
represent complicated and nonlinear relationships between several input and
several output variables (Bishop, 1996). ANNs simulate the working princi-
ples of the human brain.
An ANN is composed of three layers of neurons. First layer is the input
layer which has a number of neurons equal to the number of input variables.
The third layer is the output layer which has the neurons that represent the
output variables. The second layer resides between these two layers and is
called as the hidden layer. The hidden layer can be composed of single or
multiple layers. In each layer, there are several neurons. The neurons in the
input layer are connected to the hidden layer neurons. Hidden layer neurons
are connected to the neurons in the output layer through a network. Each
of the links in this network has a weight. Training phase determines the
weights of the links are determined using the training dataset. The resulting
network represents the relationship between the input and output variables.
Finance applications of Artificial Neural Networks include bankruptcy
prediction, credit risk assessment, stock-market and foreign exchange rate
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forecasting (Fadlalla and Lin, 2001; Huang et al., 2007; Fethia and Pa-
siourasb, 2010). Models of bankruptcy prediction determine the financial
health or failure of a new firm using characteristics of their sample of failed
and non-failed firms. Zhang et al. (1999) compared performances of ANNs
and logistics regression in predicting bankruptcy. Odom and Sharda (1990);
Perez (2006) modeled bankruptcy forecasting problem as a classification
problem and predicted bankruptcy using ANNs. Shin et al. (2005) com-
pared use of support vector machines and neural networks for bankruptcy
prediction.
Credit-risk assessment models use current and historic information about
a customer to determine whether he/she can be granted credit. Tsai et al.
(2009) and Yeh and Lien (2009) compared the prediction capabilities of ANNs
and other data mining techniques for the Taiwanese financial institutions.
Trinkle and Baldwin (2007) developed ANN models and used them to gener-
ate first-order interpretable credit models that can explain the credit decision.
Stock market and exchange rate forecasting models have been used to de-
tect stock price manipulations (Ogut et al., 2009) and to optimize portfolio
formation (Ko and Lin, 2008; Freitas et al., 2009).
The only study to use ANN for prediction of mergers is Sen and Gibbs
(1994). Sen and Gibbs (1994) compared the performance of ANNs and logis-
tic regression using 117 target-observations and 2,545 non-target observations
covering the years from 1980 to 1985. While Sen and Gibbs (1994) predict
only target and non-target candidacy, this paper develops models for both
merger and bidder candidacy that rely on a larger set of independent vari-
ables. Furthermore, the sample used in this study covers the years from
1979 to 2004 with 5,207 bidder observations, 2,641 target observations, and
308,079 non-merger firm observations.
4. Research Method
This section develops models to predict the merger choice of firms. At
any point of time, managers make a choice between three alternatives: (i) to
propose a bid to attain control rights in another company (being a bidder),
(ii) to solicit/receive bids for control rights in their company (being a target),
(iii) to neither propose nor solicit bids (being a non-merger firm). Several
variables can predict bidder and target candidacy. Section 4.1 explains these
variables. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 develop the artificial neural network models
and multinomial logit models to be used in estimation of merger candidacy.
4
4.1. Sampling Frame and Description of Variables
We follow the strategy of Tanyeri (2006) and Cornett et al. (2011) to con-
struct the sample of merging and non-merging firms and to develop predictors
of merger candidacy. The sample of merging firms (bidders and targets) are
from Security Data Company’s US Mergers and Acquisitions database and
cover the period from 11/16/1977 to 12/30/2004. We restrict the merging
sample to include those deals that show an intent to transfer control rights.
To be included in the sample, bidders must hold less than fifty percent of
outstanding target shares before the merger announcement and bidders must
propose to hold more than fifty percent of outstanding target shares after the
merger 2. Sample firms are nonfinancial US enterprises due to the differences
in regulatory environment and the lack of data availability for foreign and
financial firms. We also require sample firms to be public companies.
We apply the sampling criteria used to construct the merging-firms sam-
ple to compile the sample of nonmerging firms. We compile a sample of US,
nonfinancial firms using the CRSP-COMPUSTAT merged database. The
sample covers 110 quarters from the third quarter of 1977 to fourth quarter
of 2004. We map the merging sample onto the CRSP-COMPUSTAT data
for identification of bidders, targets and non-merger firms. A firm-quarter
is defined as: a bidder-quarter if the firm attempts at least one merger bid
in the next financial-statement-release quarter, a target-quarter if the firm
receives at least one bid in the next quarter, and a non-merging firm-quarter
if the firm neither proposes nor receives any bids in the next quarter. We also
require that the firms have non-missing data for variable construction and
windsorize the variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the effect of
outliers. These filters produce 2,530 firms proposing 5,400 bids in 5,207 firm
quarters, 2,352 firms receiving 2,706 bids in 2,641 firm quarters, and 11,010
firms neither proposing nor receiving bids in 308,079 firm quarters.
Table 1 summarizes the data set used in this study. First rows average
the book value of assets (in million dollars) of bidder, target, and non-merger
firms in each year. Second rows list the number of bidder, target, and non-
merger firms in each year. The second half of the sample (covering the years
1991 to 2004) is richer than the first half (covering the years 1979 to 1990)
in terms of merging firms. There are, on average 262 bidders and 125 targets
2We use the SDC variables ‘menumain’ and ‘formc’ to identify the deals that show an
intent to transfer control rights.
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per year in the second half and 128 bidders and 74 targets per year in the
first half. Bidders prove largest (on average 3,538 million dollars) in terms of
book value of assets. Non-merging firms (on average 962 million dollars) are
larger than targets (on average 1,421 million dollars). The size distribution
indicates that the larger sample firms buy the smaller firms.
We review theories on merger motives to develop predictors for merger
candidacy. Theoretical models establish that managers may engage in merg-
ers to generate shareholder value and/or to protect opportunistic benefits
that managerial positions enable them to enjoy. Managers may create share-
holder value by: (i) increasing efficiency of human and financial capital; (ii)
attaining economies of scale and scope; and (iii) increasing market power
(Gort, 1969; Holmes and Schmitz, 1995; Fluck and Lynch, 1999; Jovanovic
and Rousseau, 2002). Incentive conflicts between managers and shareholders
may also lead to mergers when opportunistic managers focus on generating
value for themselves at the expense of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling,
1976; Jensen, 1986; Datta et al., 2001; Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Hartzell
et al., 2004; Rhoades-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004; Jensen, 2005).
Eight variables 3, namely sales shock, square of sales shock, asset size,
asset growth, sales growth, concentration ratio, resource-growth mismatch,
and return on assets (ROA), proxy for merger motives to generate share-
holder value. Sales shock (defined as the absolute value of the difference
between the two-year median industry 4 sales growth rate and the two-year
median sales growth rate for all firms listed in our sample) is a proxy for
economic disturbances that may motivate mergers (Gort, 1969; Maksimovic
and Phillips, 2001; Andrade et al., 2001). The square of sales shock allows
for non-linearity in the sales shock variable. The proxies for the desire to
reduce costs by increasing economies of scale and scope through mergers
are asset size (defined as the log of total assets), asset growth (defined as
the two-year growth rate of assets), sales growth (defined as the two-year
growth rate in sales) (Gort, 1969; Palepu, 1986; Ambrose and Megginson,
1992; Moeller et al., 2005). The ease of entry and exit into the industry may
predict merger candidacy and is measured by concentration ratio (defined as
the sum of sales of the largest four firms (in terms of sales) divided by total
3Interested readers may refer to Cornett et al. (2011) and Tanyeri (2006) for the defi-
nitions and in-depth discussions about the variables used in this study
4Each industry covers all firms with the same two-digit SIC code. The one-digit SIC
code is used when there are fewer than five firms in an industry.
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industry sales) (Gort, 1969; Eckbo et al., 1990). Firms with a mismatch in
capital resources growth opportunities may engage in mergers. We measure
this mismatch with the resource-growth mismatch indicator (defined as an
indicator which takes on the value one (zero) if the two-year sales growth is
larger (smaller) than the industry median and the ratio of long-term debt
to total assets is lower (higher) than the industry median) (Palepu, 1986;
Ambrose and Megginson, 1992; Fluck and Lynch, 1999). The match quality
between bidders and targets may also predict candidacy. We use Return on
Assets (ROA) (defined as the book value of net income before extraordinary
items divided by total assets) as a proxy for match quality (Lang et al., 1989;
Palepu, 1986; Ambrose and Megginson, 1992; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001;
Akhigbe et al., 2004).
Three variables, namely cash ratio, prior mergers, industry mergers, mea-
sure managerial motives to protect opportunistic benefits through mergers.
Large cash reserves as measured in cash ratio (defined as cash and marketable
securities divided by total assets) enable managers to pursue personal bene-
fits and as such would enable managers to propose an empire-building merger
and would motivate managers to desist takeovers. The prior mergers vari-
able (defined as the number of times a firm proposes or receives a merger bid
in the prior two years excluding the current bid) accounts for the empire-
building motives of managers (Shipper and Thompson, 1983; Malatesta and
Thompson, 1985; Asquith et al., 1983; Loderer and Martin, 1990; Holmes
and Schmitz, 1995; Fuller et al., 2002; Ismail, 2005). Clustering of mergers
across time and industry is well-documented. Mergers may be motivated by
a desire to avoid risk by joining the herd. We measure merger clustering in
time and industry using industry mergers (defined as the number of industry
firms that made or received a bid divided by the total number of industry
firms; this ratio is cumulated for the past two years).
Mispricing of shares may affect investment decisions; hence merger de-
cisions (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Two alternative hypotheses exist on
whether managers use their private information about mispriced shares to
act in the best interests of shareholders or to protect opportunistic bene-
fits. Hansen (1987); Rhoades-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004); Eckbo et al.
(1990) state that managerial beliefs about stock overvaluation may motivate
stock-financed mergers. These mergers intend to generate long run value for
pre-merger shareholders at the expense of post-merger shareholders. Jensen
(2005) states that managerial beliefs about stock overvaluation may moti-
vate mergers financed with overvalued equity when managers want to gen-
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erate and/or protect opportunistic benefits. Three variables, share turnover
(defined as the number of shares of stock traded divided by the total shares
outstanding), price run-up (defined as the two-year change in stock price) and
information asymmetry (defined as an indicator that is one if the market-to-
book value 5 is higher than the industry median and the firm’s share turnover
is lower than its industry median), are proxies for managerial motives to take
advantage of its information advantage.
4.2. Artificial Neural Networks Model
Performance of an ANN depends on the number of hidden layers, number
of neurons in each hidden layer, training function and the data used to train
the network. The sample has a significant imbalance in the target, bidder
and non-merger classes. The sample of 315,927 firm-quarters consists of 2641
target-quarters, 5207 bidder-quarters, and 308,079 non-merger-quarters. The
number of non-merger quarters is almost 60 times more than the number of
bidder quarters and 117 times more than the target quarters. This kind
of imbalance has negative effects on the performance of learning algorithms
which assume a balanced class distribution (Liu et al., 2008). There are
several methods to overcome these negative effects. In this study, we use
the under-sampling method. This method under-samples the class with the
highest number of elements to the size of the minimum class (Liu et al.,
2008). This study separates the data into two sets: training and validation,
and test sets. Then, this study balances the training and validation set by
under-sampling, and reduces the size of non-merger quarters to the size of
the target quarters.
The input layer of the ANN model has 13 nodes, one node for each of
the following variables: sales shock, asset size 6, asset growth, sales growth,
four-firm four-firm concentration ratio, resource-growth mismatch, return on
assets, cash ratio, prior mergers, industry mergers, share turnover, price run-
up, information asymmetry. The definitions of these variables are given in
Section 4.1. The output layer contains three neurons, one for target, one
for bidder and one for non-merger firm indicators. The ANN model has a
5Market-to-book ratio is the ratio of the closing price of the firm’s common stock
multiplied by the number of common shares outstanding to the book value of stockholder’s
equity.
6The asset size variable is log of assets in the multinomial logit model and is the actual
million dollar value in ANN model.
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single hidden layer. We used MATLAB to implement the ANN model. The
network is a feed-forward backpropagation network with tan-sigmoid transfer
function for hidden layer and linear transfer function for the output layer.
Network is trained with the Levenberg-Marquardt backpropagation method.
The results of the artificial neural network model is presented in Section 5.1.
4.3. Multinomial Logit Model
The multinomial logit model uses the under-sampled data, as described
in section 4.2. Equation 1 computes the probability of being a target, bidder
or non-merger firm. Using the variables outlined in Section 4.1 (denoted X),
STATA estimates β, the variable coefficients, and computes the probability
of each merger choice for all sample firms in each quarter. Let Yi denote the
denote the choice of firm i and Prob(Yi = j) denote the probability that firm
i chooses choice j (j = 0, 1, 2):
Yi =

0 : firm neither proposes nor receives a bid in quarter t+ 1
1 : firm proposes a bid in quarter t+ 1
2 : firm solicits or receives a bid in quarter t+ 1
Prob(Yi = j) =
eβ
′
jXi
1 +
∑2
j=1 e
β′jXi
(1)
and
Prob(Yi = 0) =
1
1 +
∑2
j=1 e
β′jXi
A firm in any quarter is identified as a bidder if the probability of propos-
ing a bid is greater than the probabilities of receiving a bid and of not engag-
ing in merger activity. Similarly, a firm in any quarter is identified as a target
(non-merger) if the probability of soliciting a bid (not engaging in merger ac-
tivity) is greater than the probabilities of proposing a bid and of not engaging
in merger activity (receiving a bid). The results of the multinominal logit
model is presented in Section 5.2.
5. Results
We use 10-fold cross validation to estimate the performance of the ANN
and Multinomial Logit Models. For m-fold cross validation, we separate the
data into m-pieces and train/estimate the models on the (m − 1) pieces of
data and test on the ith piece. Later, we combine the correct estimation
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percentages on the m pieces (Liu, 2006). This yields the average correct
estimation percentage of all the m models. Correct estimation percentage
is calculated as 100∗NumModelDetectedAsClassi/NumTotalClassi where
NumModelDetectedAsClassi is the number of cases the model detect cor-
rectly as belonging to class i and NumTotalClassi is the total number of
cases belonging to class i.
5.1. ANN Model Results
We compute the correct estimation percentages of the ANN model for
different number of neurons in the hidden layer. Table 2 presents the average
results of the 10 fold cross validation on the test dataset. The first column
presents the number of nodes in the hidden layer and the following columns
present target, bidder, non-merger and overall correct detection accuracy
(in percentages). Models show different performances in detecting target
and bidder firms. Target detection accuracy vary between 32.46 and 40.25,
bidder detection accuracy varies between 43.76 and 51.83 and non-merger
firm detection accuracy varies between 49.74 and 53.74. Table 2 shows that
the ANN model with 10 nodes in the hidden layer performs better than the
other models in terms of overall correct detection percentage.
Table 3 represents the classification percentages for ANN model with
10 nodes in the single hidden layer. The model correctly identifies target,
bidder and non-merger firms with 40.25, 45.21 and 53.24 percent accuracy
respectively. The highest accuracy is for non-merger firms and the lowest
accuracy is for target firms.
5.2. Multinomial Logit Results
Table 4 presents the average results of multinomial logit estimations of
the 10 fold cross validation. Multinomial logit regressions estimate the prob-
ability of a firm proposing a bid, soliciting a bid, and neither proposing nor
receiving a bid in the next quarter in the 10% of the data designated as test
data in each validation fold. The rows of Table 4 are the real identities of
the observations (bidder, target, non-merger) and the columns are the esti-
mated identities of the observations. The model correctly identifies target,
bidder and non-merger firms with 40.32, 52.20 and 55.77 percent accuracy
respectively. Similar to results of ANN model, the highest accuracy is for
non-merger firms and the lowest accuracy is for target firms.
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6. Conclusion
This paper compares the performance of artificial neural networks and
multinomial logistic models in predicting merger candidacy. Both models
perform similarly while predicting target and non-merger firms. The multi-
nomial logit model performs slightly better in predicting bidder firms.
Multinomial logit models yield coefficient estimates for the variables that
have economic meaning. ANN models work as a blackbox and do not au-
tomatically reveal coefficient estimates. However, there exist different rule-
extraction techniques which can interpret the ANN weights, and explain the
relationship between the input and output variables (Taha and Ghosh, 1999).
Multinomial logit models estimate linear models. ANN model handles
non-linear relationships between the independent and dependent variables.
The ANN model is also powerful in handling large number of input variables
and variables with interactions among each others.
This paper uses the explanatory variables that Tanyeri (2006) and Cor-
nett et al. (2011) construct, to estimate merger candidacy. There may exist
other independent variables which can be extracted from financial state-
ments. However, logit models are restricted (by degrees of freedom) in the
number of variables they can handle whereas ANN models are not as re-
stricted. Future studies will investigate the predictive power of ANN and
multinomial logit models when the number of independent variables and the
complexity of the problem increase.
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Table 1: Asset size and distribution of bidders, targets, and non-merger firms across years
year Bidder Target Non-merger
1979 1,992 869 806
5 3 3,931
1980 2,831 573 870
40 24 7,553
1981 1,510 396 951
105 53 6,880
1982 1,205 500 1,080
176 41 7,010
1983 1,136 523 1,131
261 55 7,791
1984 1,527 761 804
264 85 11,034
1985 2,150 1,025 783
83 101 12,196
1986 2,446 380 860
116 124 12,430
1987 4,294 639 917
112 114 12,045
1988 5,052 1,179 1,023
109 116 12,186
1989 4,064 529 1,075
155 102 12,702
1990 3,518 2,342 1,173
114 74 12,644
1991 1,981 251 1,268
180 61 12,440
1992 3,060 609 1,313
183 57 12,468
1993 2,248 453 1,393
187 84 12,699
1994 2,411 536 1,351
234 98 13,433
1995 2,248 581 1,347
330 143 14,068
1996 4,197 1,153 1,333
343 139 14,864
1997 3,084 874 1,455
374 216 15,302
1998 3,226 1,251 1,552
361 228 15,488
1999 5,558 1,431 1,714
355 249 15,034
2000 8,553 1,406 2,029
280 157 13,925
2001 5,373 1,756 2,384
218 106 13,114
2002 7,712 1,456 2,443
184 58 12,751
2003 5,619 1,480 2,693
234 91 12,791
2004 4,984 2,067 3,210
204 62 11,300
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Table 2: Classification accuracy for ANN models with different number of nodes
Correct Detection Percentage
# nodes Target Bidder Non-merger Overall
7 37.78 47.75 52.95 46.16
10 40.25 45.21 53.54 46.33
15 32.46 51.83 53.82 46.03
20 40.17 48.31 49.74 46.07
25 38.61 43.76 53.74 45.37
Table 3: Classification accuracy for ANN model with 10 nodes
Correct Detection Percentage
Identity Estimate Target Bidder Non-merger
Target 40.25 22.48 37.28
Bidder 24.92 45.21 29.86
Non-merger 28.29 18.17 53.54
Table 4: Classification accuracy for Multinomial Logit Model
Identity Estimate Target Bidder Non-merger
Target 40.32 22.54 37.14
Bidder 19.91 52.20 27.89
Non-merger 24.29 19.94 55.77
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